The employment status of workers for "platform economy" firms such as Uber, Lyft, TaskRabbit, and 
INTRODUCTION time, with fairly regular hours, receiving most or all of his income from that [one] employer." 14 (As this article went to press, the court was considering a proposed settlement in the Lyft case, under which the company would pay $12.5 million and make certain other changes but would not alter its drivers' employment status.) 15 Judge Chhabria is correct that the drivers' legal status is ambiguous. Part of the problem is that courts often treat employment as a question of fact, or as a mixed question of fact and law, which implies that "employment" under the law matches up with "employment" in the economy and society. 16 But this cannot be the case. For example, while "control" is the touchstone of the traditional common law test for employment, it is neither clear why control is key, nor which aspects of control should matter, nor how much control must be exercised before a contracting relationship becomes employment. 17 The broader "economic reality" test that applies to certain employment statutes fares little better. The most coherent interpretations of that test view it as a means to determine whether workers are economically dependent upon a putative employer. 18 But plenty of classic contractors are economically dependent upon their clients, and employers are often economically dependent upon their employees. 19 These challenges have led many to criticize existing tests for employment as confusing and out of touch with contemporary economic practices. 20 We need a different approach. The starting point is to recognize that courts cannot resolve employment status questions in hard cases by mechanically determining issues of fact. Rather, such courts inevitably make substantive judgments regarding the fairness of imposing employment duties in particular instances. In this regard, employment is like the concept of duty in 14 Id. at 1069. 15 Class Action Settlement Agreement and Release, Cotter v. Lyft, 60 F. Supp. 3d 1067 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (No. 13-cv-04065-VC). The settlement requires Lyft to clarify when driver termination will be appropriate, id. ¶ 37, but does not require the company to re-classify its drivers as employees. Compare id. ¶ 37 (listing changes to termination procedures), with id. ¶ 16 (denying wrongdoing, presumably including misclassification) and id. ¶ 34 (implying that drivers remain independent contractors rather than employees). As of February 29, 2016, the parties' proposed settlement is still under consideration. See Cotter v. Lyft, Inc., PLAINSITE, http://www.plainsite.org/dockets/u8i561fd/california-northern-district-court/cotter-v-lyft-inc/ [https://perma.cc/2XWV-7NUG]; see also Tracey Lien, Lyft Settles Worker Misclassification Suit for $12.5 Million, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 27, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/business/technol ogy/la-fi-tn-lyft-settlement-20160126-story.html [https://perma.cc/LWX6-7X2W]. 16 See infra Parts I.C. & II.A. 17 See infra Part I.C. 18 tort. 21 As first year law students typically realize sometime around November, "duty" in modern tort law is a placeholder for "policy judgments about how to balance competing social priorities." 22 Or to paraphrase Prosser, employment is a battleground of social theory. 23 Courts in employment status cases inevitably draw on theories of the good to answer two questions: how much control or dependence is necessary to establish an employment relationship, and why control and dependence are important in the first place.
To resolve such questions, I argue that courts should go back to basics, 24 and focus on the role of basic employment regulations-such as laws requiring minimum wages and expense reimbursements-in a democratic society. This is a question of values and principles, not facts. Borrowing from recent legal scholarship on related questions of law and inequality, 25 and from basic republican commitments deeply rooted in our politics, 26 I argue that such laws are a crucial means of ensuring that workers are free from domination. 27 Basic employment duties deter economic and social practices that undermine workers' individual dignity and equal social standing; such duties also prohibit excessive concentrations of wealth or power, encouraging a more egalitarian and democratic political economy. 28 Control and economic dependence are therefore important not in themselves, but as signals that workers are suffering domination.
29 I hope to fully develop this line of argument in future work, but in this article I simply introduce it and apply it to the Uber case. . My analysis also builds on their argument that neo-republican theory may justify legal entitlement to contest managerial decisions. 25 See, e.g., K. SABEEL RAHMAN, DEMOCRACY AGAINST DOMINATION (forthcoming) (on file with author) (identifying concerns with domination common to Progressive-era economic reforms and neo-republican political theory); Samuel R. Bagenstos, Employment Law and Social Equality, 112 MICH. L. REV. 225, 229 (2013) . 27 See infra Part II.B. 28 Id. 29 As will be clear below, the notion of domination also captures what can be problematic about unequal bargaining power in the employment relationship. See id. [Vol. 10 The threat of domination provides very good reasons to hold Uber to basic employment duties. 30 Uber's stunning innovations depend not just upon programmers' and engineers' technological savvy, but also upon drivers' labor and know-how. Imposing employment duties would require Uber to treat drivers more like citizens, or as co-participants in its success, rather than mere inputs to production. Doing so would also tack toward the political economy we need today: one that encourages innovation rather than clinging to outmoded forms of production, but that also shares the gains from innovation fairly with those whose work or data generation make innovations profitable. While imposing employment duties will increase fares for riders and cut into profits, that is a fair price to pay for a more egalitarian political economy. 31 Part I, below, summarizes key issues in employment status litigation, using the Uber and Lyft cases as examples, and argues that the existing tests for employment are largely indeterminate. Part II argues that determining employment status inevitably involves contestable value judgments, defines and defends non-domination as a core value in modern democracies and in employment, and argues that anti-domination concerns strongly counsel for holding Uber to employment duties. Part III then considers how to move in that direction. It argues that courts should interpret existing multi-factor tests in light of anti-domination concerns, and could even hold Uber drivers to be employees as a matter of law. It then argues that any grand reformulation of employment duties should socialize rather than privatize employee benefits, while holding all firms to duties around economic questions like minimum wages, maximum hours, and collective bargaining. The conclusion considers the extension of this argument to other platform economy companies.
I. WHO IS AN EMPLOYEE?
Employment is notoriously difficult to define with precision, as the Uber and Lyft cases illustrate. Part I.A., below, discusses the key legal tests for employment, including the test under California law. Part I.B. summarizes Uber and Lyft's business models, and then summarizes the March 2015 orders in the Uber and Lyft employment status cases. Part I.C. then builds on those orders to argue that existing tests for employment are conceptually and empirically flawed.
I.A. Legal Tests for Employment
There are basically two legal tests for employment, both of which rely on lists of factual elements to determine the nature of the parties' relationship. The "control test" under the common law of agency, developed to 30 Id. This argument builds on a previous article of mine. See generally Brishen Rogers, Justice at Work: Minimum Wage Laws and Social Equality, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1543 REV. (2014 . 31 See infra Part II.C.
determine employers' vicarious liability for their employees' torts and since incorporated into many employment statutes, 32 defines an employment relationship as a relationship of control: the employer gives orders, plans out jobs in minute detail, and monitors the employee's performance. An independent contracting relationship is different. The principal in such a relationship asks a contractor to complete particular tasks, but typically has neither the ability nor the desire to supervise that work because it requires such specialized skills. 33 As one judge put it, the "paradigm of an independent contractor" is one who sells "only expertise." 34 The control test accordingly instructs courts to consider multiple factors including the worker's skills, the duration of the parties' engagement, the method of payment, and the putative employer's ability to terminate the worker at will. 35 In a factory, the control test would distinguish an unskilled assembly line worker who stays with a company for many years and is paid by the hour from an electrician retained for a week by that factory to rewire a few machines and paid in lump sum for the full job. In a restaurant, it would distinguish a waiter or cook from a restaurant consultant hired to remake the menu. On a farm, it would distinguish farm hands that perform whatever unskilled tasks are required of them from crop dusters who serve multiple farms each week.
Reflecting its origins in respondeat superior, the control test is a relatively coherent means of determining which party is best positioned to prevent physical harms to third parties. 36 A bona fide independent contractor, in this view, bears the risk of her own torts, and the torts of her own employ- 32 See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 323 (1992) (common law "control test" applies to ERISA); NLRB v. United Ins., 390 U.S. 254, 256 (1968) (affirming that test for employment under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) is control test). The control test need not be applied mechanically. See FedEx Home Delivery, 361 N.L.R.B. No. 55 (Sep. 30, 2014) (clarifying that under NLRA, the Board should evaluate "whether the evidence tends to show that the putative independent contractor is, in fact, rendering services as part of an independent business"). 33 See Sec'y of Labor v. Lauritzen, 835 F.2d 1529, 1540 (7th Cir. 1987) (Easterbrook, J., concurring); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220 (AM. LAW INST. 1958) (listing factors that should be used to determine whether a relationship constitutes employment: "(a) the extent of control which, by the agreement, the master may exercise over the details of the work; (b) whether or not the one employed is engaged in a distinct occupation or business; (c) the kind of occupation, with reference to whether, in the locality, the work is usually done under the direction of the employer or by a specialist without supervision; (d) the skill required in the particular occupation; (e) whether the employer or the workman supplies the instrumentalities, tools, and the place of work for the person doing the work; (f) the length of time for which the person is employed; (g) the method of payment, whether by the time or by the job; (h) whether or not the work is a part of the regular business of the employer; (i) whether or not the parties believe they are creating the relation of master and servant; and (j) whether the principal is or is not in business"). 34 Lauritzen, 835 F.2d at 1545 n.3 (Easterbrook, J., concurring Cir. 1968 ) (appealing to concerns of fairness as alternative overlapping policy ground for vicarious liability, and noting "deeply rooted sentiment that a business enterprise cannot justly disclaim responsibility for accidents which may fairly be said to be characteristic of its activities").
ees, because her human capital, physical capital, and skill presumably enable her to prevent those torts and to compensate those harmed, and because her temporary contract with the principal gives the principal less ability to control her work.
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Yet the distinctions between employee and independent contractor become fuzzy quite quickly. Returning to the examples above, what about a manufacturing firm that hires a contractor to perform skilled tasks along its production line? A restaurant that hires a third-party staffing agency to supply workers as needed for low-skilled food preparation tasks, such as chopping vegetables? A farm that hires families to pick cucumbers? In each case, the principal might delegate control over the details of the work, requiring only sound performance of a task. But none of these are classic independent contractors. The production contractor at a factory comes closest given the skill level of its workers, yet its permanent relationship with the manufacturing firm and its integration into the overall operation indicate otherwise.
The control test also has obvious weaknesses as applied to employment regulations. The party best able to deter and compensate for workers' torts is often not the best party to bear employment duties. 38 As I have argued elsewhere, large firms are often better positioned to ensure compliance with employment laws than their thinly-capitalized contractors and suppliers. 39 Indeed, given its relatively narrow definition of employment, the control test affirmatively incentivizes companies to avoid employment law obligations by restructuring work relationships as contracting relationships.
40
Congress and the states have responded to such problems by defining employment more broadly for certain employment laws. 41 For example, in the federal Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), Congress discarded the control test, instead defining "employ" as "suffer or permit to work." 42 Its primary target was pre-New Deal sweatshops that placed multiple contractual intermediaries between workers and the garment manufacturers or "jobbers" 37 See Lauritzen, 835 F.2d at 1544 (Easterbrook, J., concurring) ("Imposing liability on the person who does not control execution of the work might induce pointless monitoring."). 38 40 See generally Zatz, supra note 20, at 288-89 (discussing such incentives). 41 It is worth noting that the various economic reality tests apply in two distinct situations: (a) where an individual worker claims that she has been wrongly classified as an independent contractor by her putative employer, and (b) where the employees of a contractor claim that they are jointly employed by a firm that has retained that contractor's services. See Rogers, supra note 39. 42 Fair Labor Standards Act, Pub. L. No. 75-718, 52 Stat. 1060 (1938) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 203(g) (2012)). See also Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 326 (1992) (FLSA definition "stretches the meaning of 'employee' to cover some parties who might not qualify as such under a strict application of agency law principles"). Congress later applied the same definition of employment to agricultural workers under the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act, 29 U.S.C. § § 1807-72 (1983) . who effectively set their terms and conditions of employment.
43 That language was previously used in state child labor statutes to "reach businesses that used middlemen to illegally hire and supervise children," 44 such that companies had an affirmative duty to prevent child labor both within their enterprises and among their first-tier suppliers. 45 Courts and agencies applying the FLSA and certain state statutes have developed a set of multi-factor tests that seek to determine whether, "as a matter of economic reality, the individual is dependent on the entity." 46 Various states, including California, also define employment somewhat more broadly than at common law, on the theory that employment statutes "must be liberally construed" "with particular reference to the 'history and fundamental purposes' of the statute[s]" at issue. 47 California law creates a presumption that anyone providing services to a business is an employee, shifting the burden of proof to the party seeking to avoid employment status. 48 In the leading case, S.G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Department of Industrial Relations, the Supreme Court of California developed a multi-factor test to analyze the putative employer's evidence that drew both on the control test and the FLSA "economic reality" test. Those factors include the following eight "secondary indicia" of employment that are meant to look beyond the strict, formal right of control:
(a) whether the one performing services is engaged in a distinct occupation or business; (b) the kind of occupation, with reference to whether, in the locality, the work is usually done under the direction of the principal or by a specialist without supervision; (c) the skill required in the particular occupation; (d) whether the principal or the worker supplies the instrumentalities, tools, and the place of work for the person doing the work; (e) the length of time 43 whos-the-Boss-Restoring-Accountability-Labor-Standards-Outscourced-Work-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/9Q9V-2GPU] (summarizing "ABC" test for employment status used in majority of state unemployment insurance laws, which require party seeking to evade responsibility to show that "(1) an individual is free in fact from control or direction over performance of the work; (2) the service provided is outside the usual course of the business for which it is performed; and (3) an individual is customarily engaged in an independently-established trade, occupation, or business"). [Vol. 10 for which the services are to be performed; (f) the method of payment, whether by the time or by the job; (g) whether or not the work is a part of the regular business of the principal; and (h) whether or not the parties believe they are creating the relationship of employer-employee.
Those factors also include the following five factors meant to ensure that "employment" is defined "in light of the remedial purposes of the legislation":
49
(1) the alleged employee's opportunity for profit or loss depending on his managerial skill; (2) the alleged employee's investment in equipment or materials required for his task, or his employment of helpers; (3) whether the service rendered requires a special skill; (4) the degree of permanence of the working relationship; and (5) whether the service rendered is an integral part of the alleged employer's business. 50 That is a dizzying array of factors, especially considering that several of the latter five factors overlap substantially with the eight "secondary indicia." Adding to the complexity, the Borello court instructed that "[t]he individual factors cannot be applied mechanically as separate tests; they are intertwined and their weight depends often on particular combinations." 51 Unsurprisingly, courts in both FLSA cases and California employment cases have struggled to make sense of the factors and their import. As Judge Frank Easterbrook argued in a leading opinion, the tests "offer[ ] little guidance for future cases . . . because any balancing test begs questions about which aspects of 'economic reality' matter, and why." 52 Some courts simply add them up, an approach that led Easterbrook to quip, "A score of 5 to 3 decides a baseball game, but [the FLSA] does not work that way." 53 Other courts seem to analogize to a particular social image of employment: a longterm relationship, in a large facility like a factory, which is owned by the employer, and which is full of many workers doing the same repetitive task. 54 The most coherent substantive interpretations of the test view it as a means to determine whether particular workers suffer from significantly un- equal bargaining power or are economically dependent upon a particular employer. 55 All three of these approaches are apparent in the Uber and Lyft orders, as argued below. Yet, as also argued below, none of these approaches resolves Uber drivers' employment status.
I.B. The Uber and Lyft Cases
Uber and Lyft are two rising stars of Silicon Valley, and their business models are straightforward and similar. 56 Both have developed smartphone apps through which consumers looking for rides are matched with drivers who have contracted with one of the companies for ride referrals. Passengers must keep a current credit card on file with the companies. After a ride is completed, the companies draw on those credit cards to compensate the driver and to take their fee. While both companies describe this as "ride sharing," in reality nothing is shared. In Robert Nozick's memorable phrase, the apps enable "capitalist acts between consenting adults." 57 The companies are competing directly with, and sometimes displacing, traditional taxi and chauffeur services.
58
Both companies have grown explosively in recent years. 59 Their backers assert that their success stems from their creation of more efficient markets for taxi-like services. 60 Users can hail a car via the companies' apps while in their apartments, and then watch its progress toward their location. Uber and Lyft also prevent drivers from poaching one another's pre-committed fares, and deter passengers from taking a ride from someone other than their assigned driver, an issue that has undermined consumer confidence in some traditional taxi services. Uber and Lyft also aim to create a more efficient market by exploiting network effects among users of their app. 62 The more users who sign up, the more likely it is that any driver will be able to find a fare at any given time. In the long run, the companies may be able to match drivers with passengers both at the beginning and the end of their rides-meaning, a driver could pick up a passenger at X, drive them to Y, pick up another passenger at Y, drop them at Z, pick up another at Z, and so on. The companies' vast network of drivers, and the data they collect on those drivers' behavior, may also enable them to predict times and locations of high demand and therefore to advise drivers on when to enter and exit the market, to adjust fares to market-clearing levels. 63 The end result could be a market for rides in which drivers spend far less time waiting at cab stands or cruising around looking for passengers, and therefore a market that enables better service at lower costs.
The companies' critics, however, accuse them of facially violating various local regulations that impose significant costs on taxis, and of saving money by violating employment laws through misclassification of their drivers as independent contractors. 64 The latter question is at the center of class action lawsuits filed against each company in 2013. In one case, former Lyft employees allege that Lyft failed to pay minimum wages and reimburse them for employment-related expenses; in the other, Uber drivers allege that the company had failed to pass on gratuities and to reimburse expenses. 65 (At least one subsequent case has alleged that Uber also violated minimum wage laws, and I will discuss Uber's potential liability for minimum wages in what follows.
66 ) The contractual terms between the companies and their drivers are central to the cases, and relatively similar. Both explicitly state that drivers are independent contractors rather than employees. 67 Yet both hold drivers to various contractual duties designed to ensure good service. Prior to becom- ing "partners" with Uber, for example, drivers must provide their driver's license and information about the car registration and insurance, pass a thirdparty background check, pass a "city knowledge test," and be interviewed by Uber. 68 In the Uber litigation, drivers also alleged that the company exercised pervasive control over their day-to-day conduct as drivers. For example, Uber documents direct drivers to: "'make sure you are dressed professionally;' send the client a text message when 1-2 minutes from the pickup location ('This is VERY IMPORTANT'); 'make sure the radio is off or on soft jazz or NPR;' and 'make sure to open the door for your client.'" 69 Uber also requests that passengers rate their driver from one to five stars after each ride, and enables written feedback. The company "uses these ratings and feedback to monitor drivers and to discipline or terminate them," 70 and it "regularly terminates the accounts of drivers who do not perform up to Uber's standards." 71 Lyft's contractual requirements for its drivers are somewhat less detailed than Uber's, a fact that may have bolstered its argument that its drivers are contractors rather than employees. But the contract does require clean cars, requires drivers to ask passengers if they have a preferred route, and prohibits drivers from talking on the phone while driving or asking passengers for personal information so they can solicit business outside the app.
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Lyft also retains the right to terminate drivers if passengers report on their failure to follow certain policies, or even "for any or no reason," 73 though it may change that policy pursuant to the pending settlement. 74 The judges in both cases denied the firms' motions for summary judgment in separate orders on March 11, 2015.
75 While both opinions focused on control, their approaches differed. Judge Edward Chen's opinion in the Uber case was a bit more mechanical. For example, it reasoned that the level of control exerted by Uber over drivers seemed analogous to that which FedEx exercised over its drivers in a case finding an employment relationship, especially given the role of customer feedback and complaints in ensuring a particular level of service. 76 It cited cases holding that workers may set their own hours and still be legal employees, so long as the putative employer exerts substantial control while they are on the clock. 77 It noted that Uber could apparently end contracts with drivers at will, 78 which it described as important because the right to discharge a worker at will gives a putative employer "the means of controlling the [putative employee's] ac- 68 Uber II, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 1136. 69 Id. at 1149. 70 Id. at 1151. 71 Id. at 1143. 72 Cotter, 60 F. Supp. 3d at 1072-73. 73 Id. at 1079. 74 See Lien, supra note 15. 75 Uber II, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 1135; Cotter, 60 F. Supp. 3d at 1070. 76 Uber II, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 1140. 77 Id. 78 Id. at 1149 n.19. [Vol. 10 tivities." 79 Yet it held that the factors were inconclusive, especially given past courts' divergent applications of them.
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Judge Chen's opinion did not explain, however, why any of those factors was especially important. For example, it stated that the key question was whether Uber retained "all necessary control" over the worker's performance, but did not elaborate on what sorts of control are necessary or unnecessary. 81 Nor did it seek to place the factors in a broader context, for example to explain why control itself was so important. In this regard, the Uber opinion is fairly typical of case law around the definition of employment: courts tend to compare the case at bar to past cases and to make a sort of gestalt judgment.
82 This is not necessarily a criticism. The opinion hinged on the existence of numerous disputed facts and inferences, and no general theory of employment was necessary to hold that those disputes prohibited summary judgment.
Judge Vince Chhabria's opinion in the Lyft case was quite different, and frankly refreshing, in two ways. First, as noted above, Judge Chhabria reasoned that the drivers are neither classic employees nor classic contractors, and that determining their status would require judgment. 83 Second, Judge Chhabria's opinion appealed to extra-legal considerations. For example, he wrote that minimum wage laws target the "'weakest and most helpless class' of workers," because such workers need state protection "against the bargaining advantage employers have over employees," 84 and therefore that such workers should typically be classified as employees for purposes of minimum wage laws. Contractors are different, he reasoned, because their skills afford them more power to negotiate favorable terms, and because they can more easily leave a bad work situation. 85 In this regard, the opinion paralleled the Department of Labor's ("DOL") recent argument that, under the FLSA, the key question is whether an individual is economically depen- 79 Id. at 1139 (quoting Ayala v. Antelope Valley Newspapers, Inc., 327 P.3d 165, 171 (Cal. 2014)). 80 Id. at 1140-41 (summarizing cases that drew different inferences from requirements that drivers wear uniforms, and from drivers' use of personal vehicles). 81 Id. at 1138. 82 See Rogers, supra note 39, at 21-27 (summarizing FLSA case law); Linder, supra note 20 (summarizing cases that decline to interpret employment statutes in line with statutory purposes). dent upon a company. Such dependence, the DOL wrote, contrasts with arrangements in which the individual is "truly in business for him or herself."
86 Judge Chhabria's opinion also paralleled Borello's admonition that courts should interpret the definition of employment broadly, taking into account "the class of persons intended to be protected, and the relative bargaining positions of the parties." 87 Because the various factors pointed in different directions, Judge Chhabria held that the drivers' employment status would need to be evaluated by the finder of fact and denied Lyft's motion for summary judgment.
I.C. The Deep Challenges of Defining Employment
The Uber and Lyft orders illustrate several basic problems with the multi-factor tests for employment. First, individual factors are often over-or under-inclusive of admitted employment or contracting relationships, and therefore their importance in particular cases is hard to discern. Take the central question of control over the performance of work. While that may in fact define most employment relationships, many others are not defined by rigid task definition and control. The Restatement gives the examples of a cook or gardener hired in a manor; both are unquestionably employees, but both might bristle if their employer sought to exert much control over their work.
88 Such workers may enjoy substantial autonomy in their work lives, and yet be poorly compensated for their work. Uber drivers, similarly, can work whatever hours they like, and dress however they like, so long as they follow (roughly) the company's basic guidelines and satisfy passengers. The mere notion of "control" does not clarify how much control must be exercised for workers to be employees, nor how the aspect of control interacts with other aspects of the parties' relationship.
Questions of skill levels and opportunities for profit or loss are also ambiguous. On one hand, Uber and Lyft are deskilling the car-hire sector insofar as cabbies' traditional intimate knowledge of city streets is less necessary once GPS directions are integrated into the Uber and Lyft apps. This is nowhere more apparent than in London, where cabbies' licensure has long depended on their ability to memorize over three hundred standard routes in a test called, in good British fashion, "The Knowledge." 89 Once anyone can become a driver for hire, there are no special skills attached to the job. yet Uber and Lyft drivers exert managerial skill of a sort insofar as they decide when to work, how long to work, what areas to work in, which routes to take regardless of GPS recommendations, and which referrals to accept from the company. 90 Moreover, plenty of admitted employees are highly skilled-think of an associate at a law firm-such that lack of skills, standing alone, cannot determine employment status.
The drivers' degree of investment is also of unclear import. The Lyft opinion stated that the purchase of an automobile is not a significant investment, 91 but the Uber opinion stated that it is. 92 The DOL's position is that the "relative" investment of company and worker is critical, since the size of a worker's investment helps determine whether they are in business for themselves. 93 But what does that mean in the context of Uber and Lyft? The companies have enormous investments in technology, licensing, and other intangible assets, which dwarf drivers' investment in cars. 94 Yet since drivers own or lease their cars, they can use them for other business and personal purposes. The permanence of the parties' relationship will also vary widely. Some will drive for Uber or Lyft for a long time, others a short time. But that is true of many employment relationships, such as seasonal employment, and many outside contractors work a long time for one client.
The Uber and Lyft cases also illustrate a second, deeper problem with the tests. As other scholars have noted, employment relationships can be problematic for two independent reasons: that employment involves a "democratic deficit" since workers are subject to an employer's direction rather than determining their own work tasks, and that employment builds on and reinforces economic inequality. 95 This has led to arguments that employment status should turn on higher-order facts such as "unequal bargaining power" (which may signal a democratic deficit and/or inequality) and/or "economic dependence" (which may signal significant economic inequalities even in the absence of classic control over the performance of work).
96 Judge Chhabria's opinion, as noted above, appealed to both notions. The problem is that since bargaining power and dependence are factual matters, judges need 90 Cf. Lauritzen, 835 F.2d at 1540 (Easterbrook, J., concurring) (migrant share farmers exercise similar managerial skill). 91 96 See Zatz, supra note 20, at 282-83 (noting how commission-based sales or piecework methods can create apparent "entrepreneurial opportunities" while in fact rendering workers economically dependent on employers). guidance regarding how much power differential or dependence is necessary for employment duties to attach. 97 For example, Judge Easterbrook has argued that "dependence" is "frequently a euphemism for monopsony," such that it is especially telling in classic company towns or other places where workers are immobile and other work is unavailable, as in the case of migrant workers. 98 In such situations, workers are at the employer's mercy and state protection is clearly warranted. But unlike the migrants in Judge Easterbrook's case, there is no evidence whatsoever that Uber and Lyft drivers lack other employment opportunities. Moreover, the fact that workers might be dependent on a particular company once they have passed up other work opportunities does not distinguish them from independent contractors. "A lawyer engaged full-time on a complex case," Judge Easterbrook noted, "may take a while to find new business if the case unexpectedly settles."
99 Indeed, employers are often economically dependent upon workers, a point that helps explain labor law's longstanding hostility toward strikes during the course of a collective bargaining agreement. 100 "Inequality of bargaining power" takes us further, but also fails to determine many hard cases, despite its longstanding import in labor and employment law.
101 Notably, Judge Easterbrook eventually appealed to a similar notion, arguing that migrant workers' lack of skills rendered them employees of the farm; he was not clear why, but his logic seems to have been that the Fair Labor Standards Act was enacted to protect workers with virtually no human capital.
102 This is a regulation, in other words, that even a conservative enamored of neoclassical economics could embrace, if not love. Company towns and other forms of monopsony epitomize unfair inequalities of bargaining power, since in such situations one party can effectively dictate terms.
The problem is that unequal bargaining power is a pervasive fact of life in capitalist economies. As a result, simply showing that one party enjoys a substantial advantage in bargaining power does not reliably distinguish contractual situations where regulation is warranted from those where it is not. Consider the counterfactual: do employment laws ensure equal bargaining power? Clearly not. Doing so would require some combination of vastly 97 See id. at 286. 98 Sec'y of Labor v. Lauritzen, 835 F.2d 1529, 1542 (7th Cir. 1987) (Easterbrook, J., concurring) 99 Id.
improved collective bargaining rights and substantial redistribution of productive capital-in short, a fundamental reworking of basic capitalist institutions. 103 Simply appealing to unequal bargaining power does not explain when and why power differentials are sufficiently great that employment law duties are warranted.
To summarize, Uber and Lyft drivers are neither clearly employees nor clearly independent contractors under existing tests, as typically understood. The various factors developed in case law to determine employment status point in different and confusing directions. The notions of "unequal bargaining power" and "economic dependence" give somewhat greater content to those tests, but do not explain when bargaining power is sufficiently unequal or dependence sufficiently grave to warrant employment duties.
II. THE AFFIRMATIVE CASE FOR PLATFORM EMPLOYMENT DUTIES
The way out of this box is to return to first principles-to ask why substantial inequalities of bargaining power and/or economic dependence are problematic in the first place. This Part delves deeper into that question. Part II.A. lays the groundwork, drawing on legal realists' treatment of similar questions in the early twentieth century to argue that defining employment is ultimately a matter of contestable value judgments.
104 Part II.B. then argues that employment law duties should be levied where doing so will discourage domination of workers by companies or by market forces. Part II.C. argues that holding Uber to employment duties is almost surely justified on these grounds.
II.A. Employment as a Legal and Social Concept
If the existing tests for employment cannot do the work we expect, they are hardly alone in the law. To ask whether someone is dependent upon another to determine whether they are an "employee" is a bit like asking "where" a corporation is located to determine whether a state's courts have jurisdiction over it. I refer, of course, to Felix Cohen's classic article " cently written for a unanimous New York Court of Appeals that "[t]he essential thing" for jurisdiction "is that the corporation shall have come into the state," without explaining what it meant to "come into the state" or why doing so was "essential."
106 As a legal and incorporeal entity, Cohen pointed out, a corporation cannot travel and cannot cross borders as people or goods might. Its agents might travel, of course, but that is a different matter. The only meaningful grounds of decision in such a case, Cohen argued, were value judgments such as the potential hardships faced by plaintiffs if they could sue corporations only in their state of incorporation, and the potential hardships faced by corporations if they needed to defend lawsuits in many different jurisdictions.
107
Another example is equally telling. Cohen criticized the lawyers for a union in a United States Supreme Court case 108 who argued that their client was not amenable to suit because "a labor union, being an unincorporated association, is not a person and, therefore, cannot be subject to tort liability." 109 The problem is that whether a union is a legal "person" and whether it can be sued are in fact the same legal question. 110 The grounds for decision again must be considerations of policy, such as whether it is better for society to allow a labor union to be sued. 111 If so, then a union should be legally classified as a "corporate person."
112
Employment tests that direct courts to consider "control," "dependence," or "bargaining power" encourage this sort of reasoning. "Employment" is a category into which the law places certain work relationships, a legal category that carries with it particular duties on employers, and that grants particular correlative rights to employees. After all, parties to a work relationship can generally arrange that relationship in many different ways via contract. They might contract for an hour, for a day, for a summer, or indefinitely; payment might be by the hour, by the piece, by tips, or by salary; tasks might be rigidly defined in advance, or the worker might enjoy near-total discretion to carry out the work. Most of the time, those relationships are formed in the shadow of the law, and formal legal processes of courts, administrative agencies, and the like do not touch them. In that regard, employment law is regulatory rather than enabling. It comes to bear upon relationships that are formed through social and economic processes enabled and constrained in the first instance by other bodies of law such as contract, tort, and property. 111 In fact, the Court did reason in this way, despite Cohen's assertion that they followed the union counsel's line of reasoning. See United Mine Workers, 259 U.S. at 387-91 (noting harms to plaintiffs if not allowed to proceed against union as corporate body). 112 See Cohen, supra note 105, at 814 ("To criticize legal rules in purely legal terms is always to argue in a vicious circle.").
"Employment" is also, however, a social and economic concept that applies to particular work relationships. Companies and their workers may commonsensically understand their relationship as one of "employment" without thinking about the particular legal entitlements and liabilities created by the legal category of employment. Workers may return to the worksite each day based on a promise that they will be paid at the end of the week, for example, and companies will implicitly or explicitly offer regular work for an indefinite period for those workers who do so. "Employment" is much like other legal concepts in this regard. The terms "property" and "contract" refer simultaneously to the legal relationships defined by property law and contract law and to the physical objects or economic relationships that are the subjects of property and contract law.
113
Legal realists like Cohen pointed out the confusion that can result when courts must limn the relationship between legal concepts and their social and economic cognates. Such cases often lead to "errors of transposition," 114 meaning the "unreflective ascription of qualities of the physical, the mental, or the social object to the legal concept itself . . . ." 115 We can see this at work in employment cases when courts describe as a legal employee "someone who works under the direction of a supervisor, for an extended or indefinite period of time, with fairly regular hours, receiving most or all his income from that one employer."
116 That is indeed our standard social and economic conception of employment. But the Borello test for employment is broader, and the FLSA's legal definition of employment is significantly broader. 117 The various multi-factor tests for employment, unfortunately, encourage just this sort of reasoning by calling courts' attention to the traditional indicia of the social and economic concept of employment.
Errors of transposition are further encouraged by some statutes' and courts' treatment of employment as a question of fact, 118 or as a mixed question of law and fact. 119 The problem with either approach is that normative judgments are baked into the statutes and jurisprudence: remedial statutes in California, recall, "must be liberally construed" "with particular reference to the 'history and fundamental purposes' of the statute."
120 But if that is true, how could employment be a question of fact? Not in the sense that various aspects of the parties' relationship-control, duration, skills, centrality to the business, etc.-determine, without more, whether they have established an employment relationship. In common understanding, facts are facts independent of considerations of value. Values might shape how one interprets the import of facts, but the facts simply are what they are. Courts that simultaneously describe a matter as a question of fact and articulate the policy goals they or a jury must consider in determining the existence of such facts either have a postmodern epistemology or are struggling to address a matter for which they lack the proper tools.
121
The way out of this box is to bring policy considerations out into the open, as contemporary common law courts do. The concept of duty in tort law provides a helpful analogy, both in the sense that it is a threshold question that determines the existence of particular legal responsibilities, and in the sense that modern jurisprudence treats duty as a placeholder for substantive judgments. As the California Supreme Court put it in a leading case, "legal duties are not discoverable facts of nature, but merely conclusory expressions that, in cases of a particular type, liability should be imposed for damage done."
122 Duty is a matter of basic fairness and other policy considerations as well as stare decisis and other traditional doctrinal matters.
123
Courts could approach employment similarly, as a value-laden question, and still remain within traditional understandings of the common law judicial 120 Borello, 769 P.2d at 403, 405; see also Antenor, 88 F.3d at 933 (courts must interpret FLSA and AWPA broadly to effectuate statutes' "humanitarian and remedial" purposes); Real v. Driscoll Strawberry Assocs., Inc., 603 F.2d 748, 754 (9th Cir. 1979 ) ("Courts have adopted an expansive interpretation of the definitions of 'employer' and 'employee' under the FLSA, in order to effectuate the broad remedial purposes of the Act."). 121 This may be the explanation behind the empty promise that an employment relationship is created when the putative employer exerts "all necessary control." See Uber II, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 1138. "Necessary" can only logically mean "necessary to establish an employment relationship." But to avoid circularity, that reasoning requires either appeal to the social concept of employment as a referent, or a policy-driven judgment that a particular degree of control should lead to a finding of employment. The notion that employment is a function of "dependence" suffers the same weakness. Since dependence is common in many contractual relationships, we need a theory telling us how much dependence is enough, at which point we might as well call it "all necessary dependence."
122 Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 342 (Cal. 1976); see also W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 54, at 358 (W. Page Keeton ed., 5th ed. 1984) (stating duty "is not sacrosanct in itself, but is only an expression of the sum total of those considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the plaintiff is entitled to protection"). 123 For example, the factors used in California duty cases include both matters of fact and matters of policy. See, e.g., Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561, 564 (Cal. 1968) (discussing following factors used to determine existence of common law tort duty: "the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, . . . the connection between the defendant's [act and the plaintiff's harm], the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct, the policy of preventing future harm, . . . the burden on the defendant and the consequences to the community of imposing a duty, . . . and the availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance") (emphasis added); see also Ford, supra note 21, at 1390 ("[D]iscrimination" is an "umbrella concept under which we struggle over distinct, and sometimes conflicting, policy goals.").
role. Or as one court refreshingly put it in an FLSA case, companies are "fully accountable" for wage and hour violations "whenever the facts suggest that liability is fairly imposed." 124 
II.B. The Anti-Domination Principle
Neo-republican political thought and recent scholarship in law and inequality suggest a new approach: employment duties are fair when "economic dependence" and "unequal bargaining power" are sufficiently great that workers are at risk of domination. I use the term as it has been developed by neo-republicans, to capture a distinctive conception of freedom deeply rooted in the Western tradition and in United States politics, under which citizens are free insofar as they are not subject to another's arbitrary power. 125 As a matter of principle-call it the "anti-domination principle"-a good and just democratic society must protect all its members against domination.
As K. Sabeel Rahman makes clear in a forthcoming book, contemporary market processes can lead to domination in two distinct ways. The first is what Rahman terms "dyadic domination," where one party in a relationship has such disproportionate power that the other is subject to its arbitrary whims and demands. 126 Slavery is the paradigm case of dyadic domination: even if one's master does not constantly interfere with an enslaved person's actions, his power to do so renders the slave unfree.
127 But many other employment relationships can lead to less acute forms of domination that are also morally troubling. 128 The other is "structural domination," which arises "when social processes put large groups of persons under systemic threat of domination or deprivation of the means to develop and exercise their capacities," even when all individuals act "within the limits of accepted rules and norms."
129 Workers with few skills suffer structural domination when they This argument builds on recent efforts by other scholars to elucidate the distinctive role of labor and employment laws in a democratic society. For example, Samuel Bagenstos has recently argued that employment laws tend to encourage "a society in which people regard and treat one another as equals . . . a society that is not marked by social divisions such that one can place different people into hierarchically ranked categories."
130 Bagenstos argues that this value of "social equality" helps explain employment law's protections of individual privacy and employee speech, 131 and I have argued in prior work that it helps explain minimum wage laws. 132 Similarly, Joseph Fishkin and William Forbath have sought in recent work to resurrect what they call the "anti-oligarchy principle," the notion, deeply rooted in our preNew Deal constitutional tradition, that the Constitution's commitment to a republican form of government prohibits excessive economic inequalities.
133
In practice, they argue, the anti-oligarchy principle requires positive legislative acts to disperse power within our political economy, including robust antitrust laws, laws enabling collective bargaining, and other power-sensitive employment regulations.
134
The anti-domination principle incorporates but also cuts across familiar considerations of liberty and equality. For example, it requires basic civil rights (rights to enter into contracts), robust civil liberties, and distributive justice-but it also requires more, namely rules and practices that reflect individuals' "intrinsic worth," or their dignity. 135 Indeed, the anti-domination principle helps explain why distributive justice and individual civil liberties are important in the first place: because gross maldistributions of wealth and power lead inexorably to social distinctions and hierarchies. 136 That principle also requires broadly dispersed power within a society and economy. In practice, that often means granting legal entitlements to particular groupsfor failing to account for structural domination, arguing that neo-republican concept of domination is broad enough to incorporate structural concerns). 130 of workers, of "ordinary" citizens-while withdrawing entitlements from economic elites and corporate interests. This analysis suggests two powerful alternatives to the efficiency arguments that practically dominate academic employment law theory. 137 As one example of that dominance, legal scholars have often endorsed the neoclassical analysis of minimum wage laws, which holds that those laws will depress demand for labor, leading to higher unemployment among unskilled workers. 138 Better, in this view, to address distributive inequities arising from the labor market through programs such as the Earned Income Tax Credit.
139
The anti-domination principle suggests, in contrast, that far more is at stake in employment regulation than ensuring efficient markets. First, employment law duties can ensure that workers enjoy a basic sense of dignity or interpersonal equality, goods thwarted by dyadic domination. The moral economy of labor and citizenship tends toward strong distinctions between persons based on their wages and their rights in the labor market-such that those with fewer rights become less human, and those with greater market power feel privileged to dominate them with impunity. 140 As a leading class theorist argued, this leads the working poor to become "imbued with a sense of their [own] cultural unworthiness." 141 Public debates around employment practices routinely condemn such distinctions. For example, the overwhelming public support for a higher minimum wage, which persists across time and cuts across racial and political lines, 142 likely reflects such concerns. 143 Similarly, SEIU's "Justice for Janitors" campaign frequently called janitors' treatment a matter of "dignity" and "justice," not just income, in part by publicly shaming large and profitable firms who used subcontracted and poorly-paid janitors. 144 As of this writing, a Florida-based worker organiza-tion has called for a consumer boycott against the Wendy's chain, which it says "stands alone" among the five largest fast food corporations as "the only one who has refused to . . . respect the rights and dignity of farmworkers in its supply chains." 145 Both efforts reflect the anti-domination principle in their arguments that large firms have responsibilities to treat their supply chain workers as equals.
Second, employment regulations also help establish and maintain an egalitarian political economy, thereby mitigating structural domination. As David Singh Grewal has argued, no society can ensure distributive justice entirely through transfers layered atop a free market, for it "may be naïve to assume that after letting the inequality-producing market run its course there will be any agent left . . . capable of demanding redistribution." 146 Economic power leads to political power; unequal economic power leads to unequal political power; and unequal political power makes it exceedingly difficult to ensure equity through tax-and-transfer programs. Law reforms to alter the background rules of employment are therefore essential so that workers enjoy a modicum of power vis-à-vis their employers, and so that employers and consumers must internalize some of the costs of utilizing low-wage work. 147 The low-wage worker campaigns cited in the preceding paragraph also built on this notion. Or to quote the Supreme Court of Canada in a 2015 decision, during a strike, "workers come together to participate directly in the process of determining their wages, working conditions," and other work rules, and " [t] his collective action at the moment of impasse is an affirmation of the dignity and autonomy of employees in their working lives."
148
Protecting the right to strike therefore both ensures that workers are treated fairly by their employers and encourages a more democratic political economy.
Threats of dyadic and structural domination, I would argue, help explain the results in many past employment status cases. For example, should families of cucumber pickers have FLSA rights vis-à-vis the farms that contracted with them, despite those pickers' near-total discretion over their own hours and work practices?
149 Should garment workers have FLSA rights visa-vis the apparel companies who contracted with their immediate sweatshop [Vol. 10 owner, despite the apparel company not exerting day-to-day control? 150 Should subcontracted janitors for a major retailer have claims for unpaid wages against that retailer, where the retailer simply contracted with the contractor for services?
151 Should fast food workers for a franchisee have National Labor Relations Act rights vis-à-vis fast food brands?
152 Such cases, as noted above, have tended to revolve around questions of control, economic dependency, or unequal bargaining power.
153
But in each situation, the putative employer enjoys arbitrary power over the workers, and the workers are so unskilled that we can safely presume they have few better options in the labor market. Farmers have duties toward pickers, garment brands toward garment workers, and retailers toward janitors because those companies can set wages by dictating prices and/or subjecting labor contracts to competitive bidding. Fast food brands have duties toward franchisees' workers because they enjoy substantial power to set work rules, which signals control, and to set prices for food and therefore wages, which signals market power. In each situation, workers are subject to dyadic domination by the putative employer and to structural domination by the market. Concerns of domination do not provide any bright line rule for when a relationship crosses the line into employment, but they do capture what is morally and structurally problematic about such work relationships.
What is then left of efficiency? Actually, quite a bit: it is a very important social good, albeit one that should be given less importance than preventing domination. 154 It is not important for present purposes whether the goals of ensuring workers' dignity and broadly distributed economic and political power receive absolute or relative priority over welfare and efficiency, so long as they do take precedence. As the "Varieties of Capitalism" literature shows, it is entirely possible for states to pursue efficiency and equality at the same time by building the right sorts of capitalist institu- 153 See supra Part I.A. 154 See RAWLS, supra note 125, at 37-39 (state should grant "lexical" priority to basic individual liberties, then ensure distributive justice, and then consider issues of aggregate welfare or efficiency).
tions.
155 Employment laws are one such institution, and should be interpreted in light of such commitments.
II.C. The Normative Case for Holding Uber to Employment Duties
The anti-domination principle strongly suggests that Uber should owe employment duties to its drivers, at least under wage and hour laws and laws requiring reimbursement of employment expenses. 156 The likelihood of dyadic domination is clear. For one thing, the company seems to enjoy the power to terminate drivers' contracts essentially at will, 157 which quite literally renders drivers subject to the company's whims. Drivers, if not guaranteed basic employment protections vis-à-vis the company, risk becoming an underclass of sorts. Indeed, Uber executives' behavior toward their drivers suggests they already view drivers that way. The company has cut driver fares and increased the percentage it takes from fares without notice, in an apparent effort to drive out the competition.
158 Such actions are especially punishing to drivers who have foregone other employment or leased cars in order to drive for Uber, and led one D.C. driver to remark that "the drivers are getting screwed over, and . . . don't really feel valued."
159 Discovery in the Uber lawsuit has also turned up evidence that Uber managers at times sought drivers to terminate simply because "business was 'slower than normal and we have too many drivers . . . [so] we have to look for accounts to deactivate.'" 160 The company claimed that its average driver in New York earned over $90,000 a year, but a Slate writer found that claim so hard to verify that she called her article "In Search of Uber's Unicorn," 161 (July 1, 2015) , http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/laborprof_blog/2015/07/are-ride-sharing-companies-exemptfrom-flsa-overtime-because-they-operate-a-taxicab-business-.html [https://perma.cc/YDD3-M 3RK] (citing 29 U.S.C. § 213(b)(17) (2012) (FLSA exemption) and various state wage and hour law exemptions, including California). Because the companies insist they are not providing a taxicab service, I will place such concerns to the side for now, and just note that they further demonstrate how our regulatory apparatus is out of step with current practice. 157 (Feb. 9, 2015) , http://observer.com/2015/02/uber-drivers-are-scrambling-to-make-ends-meet-after-latest-fare-cuts/ [https://perma.cc/64W5-78TT].
159 Smith, supra note 158. 160 Uber II, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 1143. 161 Griswold, supra note 158.
misled drivers about their prospects. And Uber executives' apparent disdain for the media and their critics, manifest in apparent plans to surveil journalists who criticized them, 162 led one Silicon Valley venture capitalist to deem the company "ethically challenged." 163 This is simply revolting. As I wrote elsewhere, "The company's name clearly evinces Nietzsche's vision of a new morality and a new class dedicated to human excellence. But in Uber executives' hands, that ideal has become little more than a defense of privilege." 164 These are moral flaws that point toward the need for rules protecting workers' dignity. They are also the natural result of enabling large institutions to exert unchecked power over others' lives.
Uber should also be held to employment duties to ensure broadly dispersed power within the society, mitigating both dyadic and structural domination. The company has grown very large, very fast, and wants to become something even bigger: a general urban transportation and logistics firm. That would place it among a handful of Silicon Valley giants who are achieving natural monopoly status-for example, Google dominates search, allowing it to monitor almost all online behavior, and Amazon is coming to dominate retail. 165 Those companies' growth, and their ability to gather realtime data on broad swaths of human behavior on a scale never before seen in our history, 166 threaten the principle that power should be broadly dispersed within our society. Assuming that Uber's growth continues, basic employment rights will be a key bulwark against its economic and political dominance.
Holding Uber drivers to be employees will also mitigate drivers' structural position of weakness in the labor market. Since drivers have few skills that are not present in the general adult population, they are particularly likely to be on the losing end of many labor market processes. Holding Uber to employment duties would therefore set an important standard for the platform economy more generally. While platform companies are a relatively small part of our economy today, 167 they are growing, and may take over other low-wage labor markets going forward. Imagine a platform economy 162 company for general low-skill labor services, which provides temporary workers to restaurants, retailers, landscaping companies, factories, or really any other business that needs low-skilled workers. "Temporary," here, can become all but permanent, inserting a contractual intermediary between companies and their workers and eroding employment protections in the process. I frankly worry that such a strategy could soon overhaul low-wage labor markets, and a precedent that Uber drivers are not employees would encourage steps in that direction. We need to instead encourage broadly dispersed wealth and power, so that we do not lock in an unjust political economy.
II.C.i. Counterarguments
There are of course counterarguments, the most important of which are rooted in concerns of aggregate welfare.
168 If Uber and Lyft must raise prices to cover employment expenses, consumers will face higher prices, and drivers may find less demand for their services. 169 One journalist calculated that it would cost Uber over $4 billion per year to treat all its drivers as employees, $2.6 billion of which would come from work-related reimbursements.
170
Assuming the company could survive that change, many such costs will be passed on to consumers. Putting aside the fact that inability to pay is no defense against basic employment duties, such higher rates strike me as a price worth bearing. While reliable data is scarce, the companies' rider base appears relatively well off, at least in the United States. 171 One must have a smartphone to use the services, and the services focus on relatively upscale areas.
172 It therefore feels fair for urban and suburban consumers to pay higher prices for on-demand rides, where necessary to ensure equity. [Vol. 10 A harder issue is that levying excessive expenses on the companies may limit their growth at precisely the moment when they're trying to prove that their business model relies on a more efficient market. As argued above, the companies' core innovations lie in exploiting network effects among their riders and drivers. The more users and drivers who sign up, the more likely it is that any driver will be able to find a fare at any given time. But that customer network may need more time to mature. If the companies' growth is stunted unnecessarily, they may not gain the critical mass needed to fully exploit those network effects and build an optimally efficient market. 173 The companies' driver network might also need time to mature, and limiting market entry could make it harder for the companies to experiment with driver deployment patterns and driver incentives so as to determine the optimal supply and distribution of cars.
174
In addition to such positive potential welfare effects, 175 Uber's consolidation of the sector creates opportunities for low-cost regulation in the public interest. States and cities can partner with Uber to encourage environmentally friendly vehicles, consumer safety, and other important public goods. Uber could, given political will, root out discrimination against passengers of color. All of the above are far more difficult to do in fractured taxi sectors, since regulators need to work with many far-flung parties in complicated contractual relationships in order to ensure compliance. Uber, in contrast, can change labor standards and consumer safety standards by fiat, given their direct contractual relationship with drivers.
176 It would be a major loss if the companies were regulated out of existence before such goods are achievable.
Nevertheless, it is important not to confuse Uber the company with the technology that Uber has developed. Even if it turns out that Uber the company cannot sustain its pricing structure while ensuring that its drivers earn minimum wage and receive work-related reimbursements, a subsequent company could utilize the same technology, charge higher prices, and ensure decent wages for workers. It may simply be that ride-sharing at the very low costs that Uber has so far relied upon is flatly inconsistent with the antioligarchy and social equality principles. In these regards, Uber is analogous to the steel, auto, and other industrial megaliths of the twentieth century, and the retail megaliths of the twenty-first century. All revolutionized those markets, and all enabled enormous increases in consumer welfare. But robber barons were the disrupters of their age. As pervasive economic and social inequalities begin to infect our politics today, part of the solution lies in 173 See Strahilevitz, supra note 62, at 1472. 174 Cf. MORTON HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860 (1977) (finding precedent for courts maintaining a hands-off approach to nascent industries, which explains why nineteenth century courts adopted negligence rather than strict liability as the basic regime for industrial accidents). 175 Rogers, supra note 60, at 90-91 (discussing consumer welfare benefits from ride-sharing services). 176 Id. at 95-101.
holding Uber to the same duties we imposed on industrial firms in an earlier era. The lurking question of driverless cars does not, in my view, change this analysis. Yes, employment duties may create additional incentives for Uber to move in that direction. But it is unclear whether, when, or where they will do so, and also unclear whether doing so would eliminate all drivers or only some. Even assuming that transition is inevitable, it would be strongly preferable for it to be negotiated between Uber and an empowered workforce rather than imposed by Uber unilaterally. In the former scenario, drivers could make their case for retaining an appropriate share of work, or at least bargain for appropriate severance packages from the company, or for broader social supports from the state. The move to driverless cars would be a major social and economic transformation, and should be carried out pursuant to democratic processes and values. Again, employment protections are essential to realizing that goal.
Nor do some challenges of measuring work hours for platform economy companies alter this analysis. Harris and Krueger, for example, have argued that it is difficult or even impossible to measure work hours for Uber drivers, for two reasons: such drivers might perform personal tasks while they have the app turned on and are waiting for fares, and they might accept rides from multiple apps at the same time. 177 As a result, they argue, "it makes little sense to require [platform economy firms] to provide hoursbased benefits, such as overtime and the minimum wage."
178 I frankly find this argument difficult to follow. If the problem is that drivers now engage in personal business while on work hours, Uber could prohibit them doing so, using their ability to track drivers' location.
179 If the problem is that drivers use multiple platforms, Uber could require drivers to use its platform exclusively, or platforms could jointly develop with some actuarial method to estimate workers' hours for different platforms. The analysis is even simpler for some other platform economy companies; Handy, for example, dispatches workers to cleaning and other jobs, and workers have alleged that it pays by the job rather than by the hour, leading them to earn below minimum wage. 180 Rather than immunizing such companies from minimum wage laws, the appropriate response, in my view, is to require companies to ensure 177 Harris & Krueger, supra note 9, at 13. As this article went to press, a new report from minimum wages, and then require them to alter business practices as necessary to achieve that goal.
III. WHO SHOULD IMPOSE EMPLOYMENT DUTIES?
If I am correct that the anti-domination principle strongly points in the direction of holding Uber to employment duties, the question remains how to achieve that goal. The ongoing cases, of course, will require courts to make that determination. Part III.A. outlines how that principle could inform employment status cases, and argues that courts in such cases could in fact hold Uber drivers to be employees as a matter of law. But a court-centric solution here may not be ideal: litigation is time-consuming and expensive, and individual cases are an imperfect vehicle for addressing broader considerations of distribution and social equality. Accordingly, Part III.B. considers how legislatures could address such questions. It argues that current proposals for a new "dependent contractor" category of employee are generally unwise, but that legislatures should strongly consider socializing employment-related benefits and imposing employment duties on an industryspecific basis.
III.A. The Anti-Domination Principle in Employment Litigation
At first glance, it might seem that the anti-domination principle is too abstract to inform employment cases. After all, common law jurisprudence is not a matter of applying philosophical or normative ideals to particular cases, but rather of deciding cases in accordance with precedents, statutory text, broader principles of law, and the like. Even if employment status is a "battleground of social theory," 181 I do not expect any court to begin deciding employment cases based on the notion of domination per se.
But analogies from adjacent fields of law suggest this principle can shape employment status cases in more subtle ways. For example, Fishkin and Forbath envision the anti-oligarchy principle working in the background of constitutional adjudication. A Supreme Court committed to the anti-oligarchy principle would not develop formalized tests or "tiers of scrutiny" to implement it. Rather, "[w]hen confronted with legislation whose aim and effect is to act as a constitutional bulwark against oligarchy," such as campaign finance regulation, the courts should "apply[ ] a strong presumption, with deep roots in our constitutional tradition, toward upholding the law."
182
The anti-oligarchy principle would then counterbalance the Court's recent tendency to rejuvenate a classical liberal political economy. Another analogy comes from civil rights and employment discrimination law. As Jack Balkin and Reva Siegel have argued, although our civil rights tradition is generally understood to enact anti-classification rules, or prohibitions on the state's treating individuals differently on the basis of race or sex, that tradition also reflects antisubordination concerns, or concerns about the "secondary social status of historically oppressed groups."
184 For example, Title VII classifies only some sex-based distinctions as problematic: an employer cannot treat women with school-age children differently from men with school-age children, but can require that women and men wear different clothing.
185 Why? Surely because the former sort of disparate treatment is viewed as creating barriers to women's equal participation in economic life while the latter (rightly or wrongly) is not. Yet neither would be permissible if the sole concern of civil rights law were sex-based classifications. 186 Social norms that incorporate antisubordination concerns help determine which policies fall on which side of the line. "As social protest delegitimates certain practices," Balkin and Siegel argue, "courts are often moved, consciously or unconsciously, by perceptions of status harm to find violations of the anticlassification principle where they saw none before."
187
The anti-domination principle would play a similar role in employment status litigation, linking questions of employment status to social norms, our shared social history, and our tradition of employment regulations. Indeed, it is clearly embedded in statutory mandates and precedents. The Sherman Act's statement that "[t]he labor of a human being is not a commodity" 188 is simultaneously a statement of positive law and a rallying cry about the pernicious effects of unchecked labor markets on workers' dignity. In the landmark West Coast Hotel case upholding the constitutionality of a state minimum wage, the Supreme Court reasoned that state legislatures have wide latitude in employment relations because "peace and good order may be promoted through regulations designed to insure wholesome conditions . Since domination and subordination are very similar concepts, it would be possible to cast my argument in terms of antisubordination values. I have not done so because "antisubordination" is a term of art in civil rights scholarship, one that focuses upon harms to protected classes rooted in racial, gender-based, and sexualized hierarchies. "Domination," as I use it above, is meant to focus attention on relationships of economic power, which cut across and reinforce the sorts of power relations targeted by civil rights laws. of work and freedom from oppression," 189 which evinces a concern with ending both dyadic and structural domination.
190
This should have several practical effects in employment status cases. For example, courts that are attentive to the anti-domination principle could draw on different sorts of considerations and arguments. Notably, current doctrine permits courts to draw on other factors they find important, 191 and to weigh those factors as necessary, 192 taking account of the "remedial purpose of the statute [and] the class of persons intended to be protected," 193 which opens space to consider broader principles. Indeed, while the point is rarely acknowledged in employment litigation, 194 even the common law of agency ultimately incorporates broader notions of justice, including "whether or not it is just that the loss resulting from the servant's acts should be considered as one of the normal risks to be borne by the business . . . ." 195 In employment litigation, then, courts could take account of the dignitary harms attending low-wage work, the need for workers to enjoy some power over their work lives and economic lives, and the responsibilities of large, powerful companies toward workers within their supply chains. 196 This suggests a revised approach to employment status cases. Workers should be presumptively classified as employees in two distinct situations: where they are subject to dyadic domination via a putative employer's economic power or its power over their work; and where workers have so few skills that they are subject to structural domination in the market.
This approach would give additional weight to statutory presumptions of employment status, as under California law, making it very difficult for companies to avoid duties under such laws. 197 Recall the five factors that Borello identified as crucial to ensuring that employment status is interpreted "in light of the remedial purposes of the legislation," which are basi-cally identical to the key factors under the FLSA, as interpreted by the DOL: 198 (1) the alleged employee's opportunity for profit or loss depending on his managerial skill; (2) the alleged employee's investment in equipment or materials required for his task, or his employment of helpers; (3) whether the service rendered requires a special skill; (4) the degree of permanence of the working relationship; and (5) whether the service rendered is an integral part of the alleged employer's business. 199 Courts in minimum wage and expense reimbursement cases could read those factors as creating a very narrow exception from employment duties in situations in which the putative employer simply cannot exert arbitrary power over the worker, and where the worker has unusual skills that permit him or her to avoid structural domination in the labor market. A highly skilled worker (3), with significant investment in capital resources (2), hired for a short time (4), to perform a specialized function (5), and who owns their own business (1) would then be classified as an independent contractor. All others could be classified as employees. Such an approach would be justified based on the fact that minimum wage and expense reimbursement laws impose relatively meager duties on companies; that it is appropriate to place the burden of compliance with such laws on companies rather than workers; and that the violations of such laws significantly threaten to create an underclass of highly exploited workers. As noted above, I hope to develop this approach more fully in future work.
For now, however, it is clear that Uber is not a hard case. The company retains the ability to terminate drivers at will; it requires that drivers take a certain number of fares; it directs drivers to perform their tasks in a particular manner; it monitors their performance; the drivers' tasks are at the very center of its business model; and those tasks require relatively few skills. 200 Moreover, the company is getting extremely large, such that its actions have political-economic impact. In my view, a court faced with such facts could find Uber drivers to be employees as a matter of law if the plaintiff moved for summary judgment on the question of employment.
Several caveats deserve mention. First, as always, such broader policy considerations should come into play within the parameters defined by employment statutes. Under the FLSA, for example, it should be more difficult for a company to escape employment duties than, say, under ERISA, which follows the narrower control test. 201 Second, judges can and often should avoid relying on policy goals in their opinions where doing so is unnecessary. As noted above, both the Uber and Lyft opinions could be resolved at the summary judgment stage based on the disputed facts as read through various precedents. Such judgments represent, in a way, incompletely theorized agreements 202 about employment status, where one might reach the same result on the basis of a simple interpretation of facts, and comparison to precedent, or an appeal to broader policy goals. That will generally be preferable, as a matter of judicial form, than a stark appeal to one or another policy goal. Regardless, there is ample space under current doctrine for courts to adopt the approach outlined above, which would do justice far better than existing approaches.
III.B. Employment Determinations by Legislatures
Legislatures could also take up the question of Uber drivers' status, again building on the anti-domination principle. There may be real virtues to encouraging legislative action. Employment litigation is expensive and timeconsuming, and often leads to minor changes in behavior rather than concrete changes in legal status; the Lyft settlement, for example, requires the company to compensate drivers in California and to alter its policies around termination, but does not require the company to classify those drivers as employees. 203 Presumably Uber would pay dearly to not have to classify drivers as employees, and therefore may have substantial incentives to settle on similar terms if it begins to look as if its drivers will win before a jury. That would benefit existing drivers, and may force certain changes in the companies' procedures, but would largely kick the can down the road, such that the question of employment status would continue to come up in subsequent litigation.
Courts are also ill-suited to resolve complex matters of economic and social governance, since they have limited control over their caseload and must decide concrete disputes between particular parties. 204 Employment litigation, for example, pits workers against companies, but can't easily take account of consumer welfare or other externalities of employment status, whether positive or negative. The efficiency considerations discussed in Part II.C. above are one example: a court cannot very well immunize a company from employment duties on the grounds that it needs time to develop network effects, but legislatures commonly exempt very small employers from regulations. 205 Similarly, a legislature could resolve some of the ambiguities around measuring hours noted above, for example by defining the number of hours that a worker must utilize a particular platform to qualify for employment rights, or by developing a guide for such actuarial calculations.
Legislatures also have the advantage of being able to clarify the employment status of particular categories of workers. Legislatures have often done this through statutory exclusions: the National Labor Relations Act, for example, explicitly excludes agricultural and domestic workers, 206 and the Fair Labor Standards Act excludes, among others, certain seasonal workers, 207 casual babysitters, 208 and-for reasons I would love to learn-"any homeworker engaged in the making of wreathes composed principally of natural holly, pine, cedar, or other evergreens."
209 But states have also specifically defined certain classes of workers as employees. California law, for example, specifically defines various job classifications as employees, including volunteer fire fighters, 210 handymen who work for the owners of residential dwellings, 211 and certain domestic workers providing "in-home supportive services." 212 One solution to the challenge of defining platform employment would be for a state legislature to simply define Uber drivers as employees for purposes of state wage/hour and reimbursement laws on the grounds that doing so is necessary to ensure dignified work, equality of bargaining power, or other goods encouraged by the anti-domination principle. This would require a definition of drivers that clearly captures them, such as "drivers who receive passengers through an online on-demand application," or some similar term, but the basic concept is straightforward enough. A legislature could do the same with regard to other platform economy workers.
Legislatures could also define Uber drivers as employees for purposes of some laws but not for others, though ideally not in the ways urged by platform economy firms and their allies. Some have proposed, for example, a new category of workers, often termed "dependent contractors," who would be eligible for certain employment benefits but not others. Various commentators and even Senator Mark Warner have recently advocated for such a category, which would sit between employee and independent contractor, and to which companies would owe some duties (such as workers' compensation and reimbursement of expenses) but not others (such as social security and Medicare taxes). [Vol. 10 There are a couple serious problems with the "dependent contractor" proposals. For one thing, adding a third category of workers will only make employment status litigation even more confusing. The approach to this question in Canada is illustrative. Ontario, for example, defines a "dependent contractor" as one who "is in a position of dependence upon" a principal, whether or not they would qualify as an employee under existing law. 214 Other Canadian labor relations boards developed multi-factor tests for the "dependent contractor" category that look into skills, integration into the business, tools, entrepreneurial activity, and the like; others have held that a dependent contractor is one who receives at least eighty percent of their business from one principal. 215 Needless to say, none of these approaches would solve the problems identified in Part I, above. Allusions to "dependence" are already common in U.S. employment status litigation, and often do not clarify those cases. 216 Another multi-factor test, particularly one that overlaps with existing tests, would almost certainly sow further confusion rather than clarifying companies' duties. An eighty percent threshold test may also be problematic, since many platform economy workers do not gain eighty percent of their work from one or another platform. 217 Perhaps most importantly, while at least some proponents of such ideas want to encourage firms to reclassify independent contractors as dependent contractors, it seems just as likely that such a reform would encourage firms to reclassify employees as dependent contractors. 218 In other words, establishing another category of worker would encourage leveling down instead of leveling up, leading to more domination rather than less.
The second proposal has been floated by a coalition of Silicon Valley companies, worker organizations, and some conservative organizations, and calls for legal reforms to enable greater portability of benefits including "workers' compensation, unemployment insurance, paid time off, retirement savings, and training/development." 219 The group's declaration of principles is broad, but the basic idea seems to be to move those benefits to a 401(k)-type model, one that workers could carry from job to job, and to create a safe harbor from other employment liabilities for companies that experiment with new benefits vehicles. 220 While the group is diverse, at least some members seem to envision a wholly privatized benefits system rather than socialization of benefits. The R Street Institute, for example, has argued that, "[m]arkets could provide a portable vehicle for worker protections and benefits." 221 There are sound reasons to rethink our system of employment-linked benefits, which serves neither employers nor employees that well. The current price tag for benefits is significant. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, in September 2015, insurance benefits made up 8.2% of costs for private employers, and Social Security, Medicare, unemployment insurance, and workers' compensation made up almost 8% of costs. 222 Those additional costs surely deter job creation, and are part of the reason many firms seek to avoid employing their workers. The linkage of health care to work also makes it more difficult for workers to move between jobs; one important positive effect of the Affordable Care Act's passage has been to encourage workers to leave jobs they were keeping simply to hold on to health care. 223 This suggests that employment-related duties should be limited to those that advance goals that can only be achieved through changes to employer policies. I would put the following in that category: wage and hour laws, work-related reimbursements, workplace health and safety laws, workers' compensation, collective bargaining laws, 226 and employment discrimination protections. 227 Pensions have some link to employment on the principle that workers should contribute to general pension funds, but there is little to no reason that those funds should be employer-specific. Health care, Medicare, disability insurance, unemployment insurance, and job training funding could all be socialized and funded through progressive taxation, such that workers would be eligible for those benefits by virtue of being workers or citizens-not employees. Now, I harbor no illusions that Congress would socialize many benefits, and state legislatures have limited power to address benefits issues in any event.
228 For now, then, my main argument is cautionary: that exempting platform economy companies from various employment regulations would likely exacerbate rather than remedy economic and social inequality. Socialized benefits are probably a first-best solution, one worth pursuing if and when the political winds align; employer-borne benefits a second-best solution, one worth maintaining; privatization is a step backward.
As a final note, while a full consideration of the issue is beyond the scope of this paper, I would also advocate for Congress or the NLRB to ensure that Uber drivers are protected under labor laws so that they have the ability to organize and bargain collectively. 229 Taxi drivers were unionized in many cities in the past, and have begun to unionize in some cities today, While I am intrigued by Harris and Krueger's suggestion that antitrust law be amended to clarify that independent contractors can organize, Harris and Krueger, supra note 9, at 15, I do not understand why platform economy workers could not simply be defined as employees under the NLRA, and therefore entitled to bargain collectively. Proceeding under antitrust may encourage experimentation with new forms of concerted activity, but would ultimately require a new administrative structure to determine questions such as bargain unit status, unfair labor practices, and the like. Since we have an administrative agency with expertise over such matters-the NLRA-it strikes me as far preferable to grant that agency jurisdiction over platform workers. 230 and the world has not ended. In fact, collective bargaining rights could operate more smoothly at Uber than in many traditional cab sectors, since the company is a large, integrated actor with direct relationships with its drivers. Bargaining in fractured sectors with many small players is exponentially more difficult for workers, and raises challenging issues of equity among differently sized employers. There is no reason in theory that Uber could not operate far more democratically under the influence of labor laws and a powerful union of drivers. That may lead to lock-in costs and some rigidities in the companies' models, but a smart union of drivers would recognize that helping the companies to remain flexible until their business models mature is a smart strategy. More generally, unionization of drivers may be essential to ensure broadly dispersed economic and political power as Uber continues to grow.
CONCLUSION: TOWARD A NEW MODEL
Before closing, I will note that this analysis likely applies to other platform economy companies as well. Handy and TaskRabbit, both of which match consumers with workers for cleaning or other odd jobs, should absolutely be required to ensure that those jobs pay the minimum wage. 231 The firms know or should know how long workers are at particular job sites, and how much those jobs pay, and therefore can easily determine whether workers are earning minimum wage. Like Uber, those companies can presumably make reasonable estimates of work-related reimbursements such as supplies and travel costs, and compensate workers accordingly. Like Uber drivers, those workers may be subject to arbitrary changes in their working conditions, and of course to enormous market pressures. The analysis may be even simpler for drivers and workers for other platform economy firms such as Instacart, Washio, and Caviar, all of whom provide simple services such as driving and shopping, and whose hours can be easily tracked. 232 Across the board, then, there are powerful reasons to hold platform economy companies to employment duties, at least around basic economic conditions such as wages and reimbursements. Imposing such duties would encourage the firms to adapt their business models to ensure workers' welfare as well as consumers' welfare, to ensure decent work as well as high quality services. As importantly, imposing such employment duties will have salutary effects on our political economy, ensuring that power is broadly dispersed within the society. The Uber case raises the weighty question of how the gains from so-called "disruptive" or innovative technologies will be distributed. As of now, those who hold intellectual property rights to such technologies are positioned to capture enormous rents from them. But those technologies do not produce profits on their own. Profitability depends also upon data gleaned from user behavior and upon the labor of those who work under such platforms. 233 As a result, both consumers and workers have legitimate claims to participatory rights and equitable pricing from platforms.
As these technologies mature and our economy changes, one key means of ensuring equity will be an empowered workforce, one that does not suffer domination in the workplace or the labor market, and that can check Uber and other megaliths' economic and political power. While the New Deal regulatory apparatus is imperfect, it exists to mitigate exactly the sorts of economic inequalities and social conflicts that are re-emerging today. In the long run, we need an innovation policy that credits workers for their contributions to such companies' improvements to our social and economic lives. Employment duties cannot be the end of that policy, but they are an important beginning.
